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Abstract 
Reflecting on two mental health examples from our practice, we demonstrate how in the instances that critique is 
absent, the results can be dangerous. Drawing on Foucauldian theory, we propose the idea of critique, known as the 
vigilant tempering of governance (or the ‘conduct of conduct’). We advance that critique is an indispensable health 
resource for the practicing mental health nurse and for nursing more broadly, without which nursing risks 
participating in the reproduction of hegemonic discourses and practices. Critique, in this paper, is theorized as a tool 
to be included in the nurse’s repertoire, that which can unlock a variety of ontological and epistemological 
possibilities. We discuss some reasons why nursing critique is constrained and offer questions for further reflection 
and critical consideration. 
 




A compelling phenomenon is fast under way in mental 
health discourse. Largely contentious, this 
phenomenon appears to be marked by a growing 
plurality of emerging perspectives and approaches 
arising out of resistance to the medicalization of social 
problems (Green, 2018). This contentious space, 
articulated at the juncture of biomedical psychiatry 
and critical psychiatry movements is the location with 
which we open up this article. It is likewise the 
location in which we situate our reflections as critical 
mental health theorists and practitioners. 
 
In this article, we focus on the idea of critique 
(Foucault, 2007) as an indispensable health resource, 
one without which the mental health system risks 
stagnation in biomedical discourses and a lack of 
person-centered care. Beyond mental health discourse, 
critique for nursing is necessary in order to question 
institutional regimes of practice and challenge the 
reproduction of potentially unethical care. Critique 
provides nursing with a key to unlocking the 
possibilities of analysis and revealing arrays of 
ontological and epistemological multiplicity. In 
example, we offer two case studies from our practice. 
The first relates to clinical practice, the second relates 
to nursing education. Both represent common 
experiences often found in mental health clinical and 
pedagogical settings. We share how we process(ed) 
these examples, including our emerging questions 
around the perpetual absence of critique within 
practice and educational settings. We then situate these 
examples within the critical mental health movement 
and draw on critical theory. Specifically, we make use 
of Michel Foucault’s work on critique and critical 
thought (2007) to make linkages between what we 
witness in practice and the direction in which we could 
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Methodological and Ethical Considerations 
 
We adopt elements of Carolyn Ellis’ (2004) 
autoethnographic traditions. Autoethnography is a 
qualitative methodology that makes use of anecdotal 
self-reflective writing in order to interrogate and more 
deeply understand social and historical phenomena. 
To that effect, we centre on two journal entries that to 
various degrees document our lived  
experience as clinicians and educators as we interacted 
with mental health discourse and practice. The 
phenomenon we focus on is our grappling with the 
medicalization/criminalization of mental health as we 
go about our clinical and teaching work as critical 
mental health theorists. 
 
In gathering, documenting, and reporting these data, 
we ensured that no unique identifiers (names, 
locations, descriptions, highly unique events) were 
used so as to preserve the anonymity of people and 
institutions. Pseudonyms were assigned to people and 
some information (not consequential to our analysis)  
was also changed in order to more rigorously ensure 
the protection of identity. The research required no 
ethical review, given that we draw the data from our 
own documented lived experiences, with the above- 
noted privacy and confidentiality protection 
mechanisms in place. 
 
Witnessing a Troubling Disparity in Care: The 
Story of Craig 
 
The first example is taken from a reflective journal 
entry. It describes a clinical practice scenario in a 
Canadian hospital where the journal entry author 
worked as a clinician. It is this experience, journaled 
below, that became the pivotal turning point by which 






I remember it like it was yesterday. Craig. 13 years old, admitted to the psychiatric unit where I was working 
part-time. He wasn’t walking, talking, toileting or eating. He wore a white baseball hat, sunglasses, and his 
head was bowed downwards. He had, for all intents and purposes, shut down. He had retreated inwards. To 
me, I thought we would provide him with a reprieve where he would, at his own pace, find his way back out. 
I admitted him, called the IV team, and spoke gently with him despite receiving no reply. His father lumbered 
over and supervised all interactions, including those with his wife, whose affect was flat and sullen. Craig’s 
siblings uncharacteristically clung to the nurses on the unit, setting off warning bells in my pediatric nursing 
heart. I provided report to the night charge nurse and left. And then… 
  
When I returned in 72 hours, I learned that he had been sent quietly to an adjoining hospital for 
electroconvulsive therapy (ECT), with an additional procedure scheduled for later today. I asked in report 
whether he had been seen by any social workers and whether any investigation into abuse had been 
commenced? Later that day, the head nurse took me into the utility room and asked me why I had to “bring 
that feminist stuff here, onto the unit?”   
  
Soon, Craig was eating, talking, walking, and his baseball and sunglasses had had been removed. His mood 
fluctuated between guarded and guardedly boisterous. Transported via basement halls to an adjoining adult 
hospital in the early morning, I learned that Craig received electroshock approximately six times. I looked in 
the chart and found no indication that he had received ECT. 
 
Two floors down, I had recently worked with a similarly-aged young man, where we did everything we could 
to ensure that nothing would touch him that could possibly irritate or injure his skin. We removed the visiting 
hour rules, linked him with play therapy, an occupational therapist, and school teachers. We ensured his 
parents and siblings had their own supportive listener to process things with.  
 
Why the difference in approach? The only discernible difference was that boy two flights down had cancer 
and Craig was on the hospital’s psychiatric unit.  
 
The day he was discharged is etched in my mind. He wore a brown corduroy jacket and looked back over his 
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What was witnessed raised a number of questions: 
Why was there no notation in the chart? Was this  
 
intentional? Why was the asking about the possibility 
of abuse considered feminist? How could it be missed 
that what was happening to Craig was not likely in  
 
his best interest? And worse, was my being taken aside 
an example of an expectation to dismiss the  
 
maleficent? And why the rush? Why was he not 
afforded the time to develop trust with at least one 
skilled practitioner so that he, in his own way, might 
be able to help us understand his needs, fears, and 
reasons for retreating? Why such a difference in 
approach between two boys of equal intrinsic value? 
Is that the core issue? Is it that the boy with cancer was 
‘blameless’ whereas the boy admitted to psychiatry 
was somehow not? 
 
Victim-blaming approaches that suggest this was 
simply bad parenting, a weird kid, or an ‘odd-ball’ 
family (a narrative that dominated the team 
discussions about Craig and his family) are a symptom 
of the wide-spread adoption of the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders’ (DSM) focus 
on categorizing abnormality (Breggin, 1991; Burstow, 
2005; 2015) . The DSM individualizes scenarios, 
negating the need to ask ourselves: “Yes, but why?” 
Unpacking this situation steers us away from surface-
level suppositions about a ‘weird’ kid and his ‘weird’ 
family. It involves asking complex questions. It 
involves avoiding simplistic surface-level 
assumptions that give way to short term ‘solutions.’ 
Was the problem to be solved that he was not walking, 
talking, toileting, or eating, or was it broader? Rather 
than viewing his mother as odd or as a bad mother 
because her children were unusually clingy (implying 
failed maternal attachment or some sort of other 
pathologization of mothers), asking critical questions 
means that we search to understand the myriad of 
reasons underlying the mother’s flat affect. This 
includes understanding the many possible dynamics in 
a family that might perhaps explain why a father is 
speaking on behalf of his wife, her downcast eyes, the 
clinginess of the other children, and first and foremost, 
the reasons why Craig retreated inwards. And all of 








The Violent Mental Patient: Reproducing the 
Myth 
 
The second example (next page)  is also an excerpt 
from a journal entry comprising a brief composite of a 
collection of responses of undergraduate nursing 
students as they engaged in dialogue with one of the 
authors. This recent journal entry comprises extracted 
recollections from over a decade of teaching 
experience, during which these responses and ideas 









In this entry, I reflect on two distinct but related experiences I had over the last several years. It is the fall of 
2018, and as I sit here and recollect past interactions with my nursing students, specifically those that relate 
to conversations around mental health and mental illness, I cannot help but problematize the implications of 
such experiences.  
 
The first involves a group seminar I led almost a decade ago, of fourth-year undergraduate nursing students, 
during which I facilitated a discussion on the media’s portrayal of mental illness by using a newspaper 
clipping as an example. Before engaging in a critical discourse analysis of the news source, I asked the group 
of eight students to give me their definitions of mental health. In a rather interesting discussion, what 
surfaced were such ideas as “stability,” “balance,” “productivity,” “neurotransmitters,” “family history,” and 
“the brain.” Among other related concepts, students drew on medical diagnosis, interventions, “treatment,” 
and “recovery.” Some students even alluded to the link between “unpredictability of behaviour” and 
violence. This is a fitting segue, given the seminar focused on a critical discussion on the media’s perpetual 
reproduction of the myth of the violent mental patient.  
 
A second, more recent experience involves my leading a large lecture for third-year undergraduate nursing 
students. The topic is community mental health. I had just finished presenting a short discussion on the mad 
community and the antipsychiatry movement, emphasizing the latter’s rejection of psychiatry as a legitimate 
medical specialty and casting doubt on the validity of psychiatric diagnoses. A student raised his hand and 
asked: “but what about the chemical imbalance and neurotransmitter science?” Other students joined this 
discussion, asking questions, pointing to the difficulty (impossibility for some) to accept that mental illness–
given it is a medical issue–lacks the scientific validity given to organic medical diagnoses. The extent of 
these students’ criticality found its limits at such ideas as “stigma” and “patient-centeredness,” often using 
diagnosis and recovery-based language such as “patient,” “illness,” and “care.” 
 
Recalling some recent statements, the following distinctly come to mind: 
“Diagnosis helps us understand what the problem is.” 
“I can’t wrap my head around that mental illness is not a disease.” 
“What about people whose behaviour is just bizarre and those who are violent?” 
 
 
We can potentially gather by some of the lexical 
choices made by the students, that mental 
illness/health is theorized in a rather biomedical way. 
Highly evident in the students’ general responses are 
discourses of biomedicine, risk, violence, and 
problem-based understandings of mental illness and 
mental health. 
What is most worrisome about the implications of 
these student responses is neither the biomedical 
default with which they explained mental health nor 
the ready-made linkages made between mental health 
and social “balance,” troubling though that is. What is 
most unsettling is a sort of natural correlation between 
the ‘mentally ill’ and “behavioural unpredictability,” 
while linking it to violence. Despite a robust critical 
discussion on stigma that preceded this lecture, 
students were still found to inherently label, 
categorize, and segregate people and communities into 
social “misfits” based on a mental illness diagnosis 
and based on behavioural manifestation.  
 
If we momentarily step back and reflect on  how it is 
that students, time and again, come to articulate mental 
health in such biomedical and rigid ways and in such 
ways that inherently reproduce problematic 
understandings of people and communities who suffer 
disruptions in their mental health, we must ask some 
complex and difficult questions. We must extend our 
questions beyond the focus on individual 
nurses/nursing students and individual patient care 
units. We must direct our critical gaze at the level of 
the institution of psychiatry and the discourses that 
support it and subsequently give rise to such 
malevolent practices. Not dissimilar to the questions 
we ask around Craig’s case, here too, these student 
responses beg an investigation that delves beyond 
individual student ‘attitudes’ and ‘knowledge,’ and the 
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Mental Health: An Alternate Epistemology 
 
While we–and other nurses and nursing scholars–have 
begun to take issue with mental health and psychiatric 
practices, we are not alone. Through decades of 
clinical practice, higher education,  
 
 
research, and activism work, we have come to learn 
that despite the assumed legitimacy and the  
 
‘efficiency’ of institutionalized mental health services, 
there is a counter-narrative that likewise critiques and 
sometimes rejects these services. It is a narrative that 
advances critical perspectives deployed from lived 
experience, advocacy, and activism. 
 
While the nursing academy is aggressively preparing 
nurses heavily immersed in biomedical mental health 
discourse (Adam, 2017), a counter-discourse is 
gaining momentum in talking back to psychiatric 
hegemony. This discourse is modestly buttressed by 
the voices of psychiatric survivors (Andre, 2009; 
Chamberlin, 1978; Funk, 1998) and largely by 
community activists and medical and nursing scholars 
(Breggin, 2008; Hagen & Nixon, 2011; van Daalen-
Smith, 2011; van Daalen-Smith et al., 2014). 
 
A number of works has de-legitimized psychiatric 
diagnoses while calling into question the 
appropriateness of psychiatry’s authority over human 
behaviour (Burstow, 2015; Hagen 2007; Hagen & 
Nixon, 2011). Others have suggested that psychiatric 
logic is predicated on linguistic theory such as 
semantics and metaphors (Burstow, 2015; Edelman, 
1974; Szasz, 1996 & 2003), and practices of social 
control (Burstow, 2015; Chapman, 2014; Fabris, 2011; 
Foucault, 1988; Minkowitz, 2014). Labelling theorists 
have found stigma as an inherent characteristic of 
psychiatric diagnoses (Goffman, 1961). Psychiatric 
drugs have been shown to cause irreversible chemical 
imbalances in the body, including brain damage 
(Breggin, 2008; Burstow, 2015; Lehmann, 1998), and 
were found to be implicated in an institutional-
political business complex, rampant with private 
interests having little to do with patient well-being 
(Breggin, 2008; Burstow, 2015; Healy, 2012; 
Whitaker, 2002). Disability has also been documented 
as a direct cause of such psychiatric treatments as 
neuroleptic medications and electroshock (Breggin, 
2008; Fabris, 2011; Funk, 1998; Sackeim, Prudic, 
Fuller, Kielp, Lavori, & Olfson, 2007). Further to that 
effect, Harrow and Jobe (2007) established that those 
diagnosed with schizophrenia thrive better socially 
without medication than those on antipsychotics. 
Critiques of psychiatric interventions have also been 
documented by the United Nations as degrading and 
undignified (United Nations, 2013). The damage of 
other psychiatric treatments is also well documented 
(Andre 2009; Burstow, 2006; Funk, 1998; van Daalen-
Smith, 2011; van Daalen-Smith et al., 2014). 
 
These critical perspectives are so much an established 
position that plausible alternatives to psychiatry have 
been theorized (Burstow, 2015; Chamberlin, 1978) 
and successfully implemented (Breggin, 2017; Oaks, 
2011; Stastny & Lehmann, 2007). For example, 
Bonnie Burstow sketches out the beginnings of a 
world without psychiatry. She outlines, using several 
scenarios of people in various states of distress, what 
a community-based, non-professionalized, non-
pathologizing approach to ‘care’ might look like. She 
does this with great complexity and careful attention 
to the dismantling of psychiatric hegemony. Peter 
Breggin–a practicing psychiatrist–has gone a step 
further and implemented what has come to be 
internationally known as the Centre for the Study of 
Empathic Therapy, Education, and Living. In his own 
words, Peter Breggin describes empathic therapy as a 
practice that: 
 
recognizes, welcomes and treasures the 
individuality, personhood, identity, spirit or 
soul of the other human being in all its 
shared and unique aspects.   
Empathic therapies offer a caring, 
understanding and empowering attitude 
toward the individual’s emotional struggles, 
aspirations and personal growth.  They 
promote the individual’s inherent human 
rights to life, liberty and the pursuit of 
happiness.  They respect the autonomy, 





Over and again, psychiatric survivors have expressed 
the negative experiences they had and continue to have 
with psychiatric care. Their narrative populates a 
growing body of evidence that has compelled 
clinicians, health researchers, and legislators to pay 
attention. The lived consequences for the individual 
range between a dissatisfaction with the care to 
experiences of overt violence and trauma (Andre, 
2009; Chamberlin, 1978; Funk, 1998). According to 
these and other survivors, at stake is their dignity, their 
personhood, their minds, their bodies, and their lives 
beyond psychiatric care–with their families, friends, 
the workplace, and society at large. For us, at stake is 
the nurse-client relationship: A relationship grounded 
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in the stalwart protection of the patient’s safety, 
dignity, and human rights. 
 
Notwithstanding this critical movement, nursing 
remains near-silent on matters of madness and 
psychiatric survivorship perspectives–evident in its 
undergraduate education (Adam, 2017) and from our 
observations in our own practice–a perspective 
without which mental health nursing remains largely 
biomedically-oriented, while marginalizing other 
forms of knowledge. Symptomatic of this silence is the 
sort of practices that arise in clinical and educational 
settings in nursing, much like those represented by the 
two examples we discuss above. Nursing has much to 
learn from this critical movement, especially from the 
mass of voices of survivor-consumer groups and their 
advocates. That this critical movement exists while 
nursing mental health care continues to be 
biomedically delivered is evidence that critique in 
nursing is at best inadequate. 
 
Minimally, nursing practice ought to represent what 
the recipients of care–those whose wellbeing we have 
been entrusted to ensure–deem helpful. How then, do 
nurses begin to work towards this sort of practice? 
How can nursing draw on this critical movement and 
render material change in mental health nursing 
discourse and practice? More broadly, what tools can 
be added to the nurse’s repertoire to enable the nurse 
to engage in this sort of analysis, not just in mental 
health settings, but in all facets of nursing work? We 
argue that the only sustainable way for nursing to do 
this is to equip nurses with an enduring method of 
critique, the sort of critique that demands of us 
complex, difficult, and ‘unwelcome’ questions. It is 
the sort of critique out of which much of the works 
cited above emerged. In the next sections, we offer 
some possible directions, beginning with a discussion 
on critical thought while drawing on critical theory. 
 
Thinking Beyond the Bedrails: Critique as a 
Virtue 
 
Foucault (2007) defines critique as “the art of not 
being governed quite so much” (p. 45). From a 
Foucauldian perspective, ‘government’ refers to the 
“conduct of conduct” (Gordon, 1991, p. 1). Questions 
around governance, therefore, require an analytics of 
government, a critical reflection about how 
institutional rationalities and practices shape nurses’ 
conduct and, in turn, how nurses are involved in 
shaping the conduct of others (Dean, 2010). In short, 
we refer to the idea of governance as the conduct of 
conduct, that which is deployed by institutions steeped 
in such powerful discourses as psychiatry, 
pharmacology, biomedicine, and so on. The idea of 
“not so much” is an important one for our 
consideration, as it suggests that governance in and of 
itself is not necessarily a negative force. Along with 
the acceptance that to a certain degree, governance is 
necessary, in an effort to avoid ‘dangerousness’ of 
some discourses, however, we must practice vigilance. 
Not being governed quite so much, thus, involves the 
tempering of such governance, ostensibly through a 
critique of what conduct should or should not be 
tolerated. Foucault (2000) writes, “the suffering of 
men [sic] must never be a silent residue of policy. It 
grounds an absolute right to speak up to those who 
hold power” (pp. 474-475). He later provides us with 
two anchoring points that are relevant to how we see 
nurses engaging in critique (Foucault, 2007). The first 
is the refusal to accept unjust laws that by the virtue of 
their application, “they hide a fundamental 
illegitimacy” (p. 266). The second point is to do with 
not accepting as true what an authority says is true 
simply because it is told by an authority. 
 
At first glance, these points may seem rudimentary, 
especially to a conscientious, ethically-grounded 
practitioner, that seeking justice and questioning face-
value authoritative claims are an achievable 
professional expectation of the nurse. On closer 
examination, however, asking these of nurses, 
especially those working within mental health and 
psychiatric settings may prove more difficult than 
meets the eye. For example, while many nursing 
students and indeed their clinical instructors 
experience moral distress during psychiatric clinical 
rotations, they find they have no recourse but to go 
along in order to maintain the placement (Wojtowicz, 
Hagen & van Daalen-Smith, 2013). The students from 
the second journal entry excerpt, while articulating 
rather problematic conceptualizations of mental 
health, ostensibly did so in the best interest of the 
hypothetical patient. Theirs was an analysis that 
justified labelling and stigmatization (however 
invisible to them), because by way of 
labelling/diagnosing, they also entered the patient into 
what they believed is a helpful medical discourse. The 
students, evident in one response, also felt it important 
to label/diagnose in order “understand” what the 
problem was. This is all rooted in the desire and the 
commitment to help people, particularly those who 
have been constructed as suffering from a brain-based 
chemical/medical condition. 
 
The nurses who participated in sending Craig to ECT 
operated within an institutional mandate constructed to 
give the illusion of beneficence–that all else has failed 
in the treatment of his depression, that subjecting him 
to a violent intervention is an act deemed to be done in 
his best interest. It is this level on which most nursing 
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clinicians have been made to work, often embedded in 
an institutional-discursive system of efficiency and 
hyper-governance (Adam, 2014; Adam, 2017). This 
system would find that mental health nurses comply 
with a set of institutional regulations, governed by 
powerful psychiatric and legislative texts that navigate 
their practice and their consciousness in a particular 
way (Adam, 2017; Wojtowicz, Hagen & van Daalen-
Smith, 2013). 
 
Nurses, alternatively, might possess the moral 
character and courage to engage in the sort of critique 
Foucault advances. For example, the nurses in the case 
of Chris, even those who might have acted in rather 
violent ways, did so in accordance with an ethical 
commitment to ‘helping’ someone deemed to be in a 
state of severe distress. While nurses do possess the 
ability to engage and act in ethically sound ways, their 
ethical reasoning appears to be constrained by 
institutional reasoning. Through critique, however, 
and by way of unpacking the knowledge and practices 
that are privileged in an institution, nurses can 
simultaneously uncover the professional, 
sociocultural, and historical perspectives that have 
been suppressed under the current regimes of mental 
health care and make them available to individual and 
collective interrogation (Dean, 2010). 
 
What is Constraining Critique in Nursing? 
 
It would be politically and ethically naïve to suggest 
that nurses–or any practitioners from the helping 
professions–intentionally engage in maleficent 
practice. It is not refuted here, that nurses deliberately 
enter practice with a genuine desire to help others. 
However, and while the proverbial nursing heart is in 
the right place, upon entry and subsequent long-term 
immersion in institutional discourses that measure 
success in terms of biomedical outcomes and social 
conformity and productivity, nurse’s priorities and 
practices become constrained (Adam, 2011). 
Moreover, nursing practice–education included–
appears to also be caught within a nexus of power, 
namely articulated by relations between medicine, 
nursing, and Big Pharma (Adam, 2014; Adam, 2017). 
These relations, substructed by powerful discourses, 
substantially navigate nursing work in a way to 
respond to institutional (hospital, clinic, university) 
(Adam & Juergensen, 2019) and discursive 
(psychiatry, Big Pharma, managerial) interests (Adam, 
2014).  
 
Without critique, those nurses who find themselves at 
the juncture between biomedical psychiatry and 
critical mental health work will be minimally curious 
about problematic psychiatric care, and at best, in 
moral distress resulting from such curiosity. While 
there is much work to be done in order to extend 
nursing’s gaze ‘beyond the bedrails,’ emancipatory 
critical thought is possible, as is a new way of doing 
mental health nursing discourse and practice. We 
agree with Foucault’s conception that critique is (or 
ought to be) a virtue, a constant striving for moral 
excellence (Foucault, 2007), woven within the 
character of the nurse. Rooted in a relational practice, 
critique as an ethical orientation, in our view, can 
effectively equip nurses to work towards not being 






Exemplified in the two reflective journal excerpts 
described in this paper is the indispensability of 
critique. The two excerpts illuminate moral tension 
between the medicalization of mental health care and 
nursing’s ethical imperative to infuse professional 
practice with a concern for preserving human dignity, 
preventing harm and promoting social justice 
(Canadian Nurses Association [CNA], 2017; Edwards 
& MacLean Davison, 2008). In sharing our critical 
reflections and our theorizing, we aimed to illustrate 
the power of nurse-led critical reflection and its 
potential to advance nursing discourse and practice.  
 
Specifically, we demonstrate how questioning 
dominant discourses simultaneously opens up the 
possibility of considering counter-discourses that 
challenge the status quo. Despite the tensions that 
might arise, we submit that critique as reflection is not 
merely criticism, but a positive force for questioning 
practice and advocating for change. As Foucault 
(1983) once argued: 
 
My point is not that everything is bad, 
but that everything is dangerous, which 
is not exactly the same as bad. If 
everything is dangerous, then we 
always have something to do. So, my 
position leads not to apathy but to 
hyper–and pessimistic–activism. (p. 
231). 
 
Critique can subsequently be viewed as a form of 
‘vigilance,’ a continuous ‘checking-in’ with ourselves 
and others about the effects of our conduct. It is a 
conscientiousness towards recognizing both the 
strengths and limitations of institutional policies and 
practices and mitigating their dangers. We offer these 
examples to illustrate the value of critique as a tool for 
reflecting on assumed truths, taking risks to ask 
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unwelcome questions, leading a collective pause, and 
feeling comfortable admitting we may not have all the 
answers. 
Critique, we suggest, is an indispensable tool 
for understanding tensions, inspiring strategic 
dialogue about the direction of nursing work, 
and mobilizing care that accounts not only for 
institutional goals, but also considers nursing 
and client perspectives in what is morally 
sound. It disrupts the status quo by challenging 
taken-for-granted assumptions, directing us to 
look beyond what becomes 
routinized.  Through the deconstruction of 
competing discourses circulating as truth, 
critique enables structural thinking, facilitating 
an exploration of wide berth. If we have the 
courage to embrace critique as an indispensable 
resource, the key to unlocking an array of 
ontological and epistemological possibilities is 
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